Following a Sigmoid Progression: Some Jurisprudential and Pragmatic Considerations Regarding Territorial Acquisition Among Nation-States by Duncan, John C., Jr.
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 1 Article 1
1-1-2012
Following a Sigmoid Progression: Some
Jurisprudential and Pragmatic Considerations
Regarding Territorial Acquisition Among Nation-
States
John C. Duncan Jr.
Florida A&M University College of Law, john.duncan@famu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Duncan Jr., Following a Sigmoid Progression: Some Jurisprudential and Pragmatic
Considerations Regarding Territorial Acquisition Among Nation-States, 35 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1
(2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol35/iss1/1
1 
                                                                                                                     
FOLLOWING A SIGMOID PROGRESSION: 
SOME JURISPRUDENTIAL AND PRAGMATIC 
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING 
TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION AMONG 
NATION-STATES 
John C. Duncan, Jr.* 
Abstract: This article analyzes methods and doctrines used by States to ac-
quire territories. The role of the United Nations in resolving disputes be-
tween nations and the inhabitants directly affected by the disputes is also 
addressed, including the jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and practical con-
siderations of territorial acquisition. Finally, traditional territorial acquisi-
tion doctrines are applied to extraterrestrial and outer space acquisition. 
As Western civilization etched out territories and borders across its known 
world, international norms of diplomatic behavior appeared in the form 
of customs. These customs eventually grew into codifications, which in 
turn grew into the elaborate international system enjoyed and protested 
today. Laws emerged among international States to formalize the growing 
body of norms of interaction across them. Modern territorial sovereignty 
provides the State an “exclusive right” to perform State functions within 
that territory, but with a realization that no State may exercise its authority 
within the territorial limits of other States. 
Introduction 
 Before lands were “possessed” and nation-states emerged, there was 
territory. For millennia, people have organized themselves into groups, 
tribes, and nations for community-level protection, kinship, and com-
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mon identity.1 The laws that emerged in these high-context social struc-
tures codified the accepted, informal standards of interaction.2 National 
boundaries, a relatively recent innovation in human history, character-
ize the nation-state and organize the world as we know it; they are purely 
symbolic but strict limits on identity and connection to higher-order so-
cial groups.3 Indeed, as fields of social regulation, both international 
relations and international law depend heavily on specific definitions in 
order to function in arenas of ambiguity and fluid inference.4 
 As Western civilization etched territories and borders across the 
known world, international norms of diplomatic behavior appeared in 
the form of customs.5 These customs were eventually codified and grew 
into the elaborate international system we know today.6 Eventually, laws 
emerged within societies to formalize this growing body of norms of 
international interaction.7 In the fourteenth century BC, for example, 
treaties between Egypt and its neighbors reveal that even hundreds of 
years ago principles of mutual sovereignty and equality among political 
entities were firmly entrenched.8 The Greeks developed a similarly 
complex system of international laws to regulate interactions among 
their city-states.9 
 International rules of territorial acquisition, in their modern form, 
are largely a product of the last five centuries.10 This history suggests 
their peculiarly European origins; indeed, modern international law of 
territorial acquisition is almost exclusively a product of Western civiliza-
tion, rather than an equitable interaction among all civilizations.11 To 
be sure, the concept of diplomatic immunity was influenced by Islamic 
civilizations and the practices of the Ottoman empire, but this influ-
                                                                                                                      
1 John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law 22 (1927). This book provides a fascinating 
in-depth look into the origins and evolution of legal development. 
2 See id. at 24. 
3 See I.A. Shearer, Starke’s International Law 172 (11th ed. 1994). 
4 See M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law 19 (1926). 
5 Zane, supra note 1, at 418. 
6 See id. at 419. 
7 See id. at 24. 
8 Charles G. Fenwick, International Law 5 (4th ed. 1965). 
9 Id. at 9. 
10 Shearer, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
11 Id. at 7–9. For a comprehensive discussion and categorization of the world’s civiliza-
tions, see generally 1 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History 51–128 (2d ed. 5th impres-
sion 1951). For a formulation of Toynbee’s categories within the context of international 
relations per se, as well as a very insightful update to Toynbee’s categories to conform to the 
modern day, see generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Aff., 
Summer 1993, at 22. 
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ence registered relatively late in the evolution of established European 
rules of international conflict avoidance that formed during the peri-
ods of most European expansion.12 
 Encounters between Europeans and the indigenous societies of 
the Americas did not immediately create the basis for determining the 
rules of intercivilizational interaction, but rather clarified for Europe-
ans the need to establish rules for minimizing conflict among Euro-
pean Powers.13 The European Powers thus adopted rationales that 
served their interests without regard for the rights or well-being of the 
indigenous societies that already occupied lands “discovered” by Euro-
pean explorers.14 The Europeans’ insistence on adopting universal 
rules of international interaction is therefore significant; it reflects a 
departure from the earlier practice of extending hegemony over for-
eign peoples.15 This motivation to build universal rules of international 
law prevailed in international relations far beyond those rules’ immedi-
ate utility in managing relations among European powers.16 In this re-
gard, the Europeans’ strong desire to formulate universal rules—rather 
than those that simply served national interests—is remarkable.17 In 
later centuries, this logic was extended to practices of members of the 
world community, at times to the detriment of members of Western 
civilization who would have preferred to forego hegemonic interests 
altogether rather than to flout the objective of universal rules of inter-
national interaction.18 
 Self-serving rules from the era of post-Renaissance European heg-
emonic expansion grew into tenets of international law that exist to-
day.19 Even so, parties to modern discussions of international law fail to 
recognize the fact that international law is a product of European civili-
zation’s unique perceptions of the “natural” order of the world, instead 
clinging to the notion that universality is inherent in rules of interna-
tional interaction.20 Ultimately, modern international law is the out-
growth of an unwavering adherence among the Western European 
powers to the purported universality of the rules they adopted to fore-
                                                                                                                      
12 See Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by 
Force in International Law and Practice 34 (1996). 
13 See id. at 45. 
14 See id. at 46. 
15 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 23–24 (6th ed. 2008). 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. at 13–14. 
20 See id. at 39. 
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stall conflict among themselves as they pursued their respective hege-
monic ambitions.21 To be sure, had such rules of international law pre-
served those tenets that were fundamentally generalizable only to Euro-
pean powers—for example, the Papal differentiation between Christian 
peoples and all others—there would be no perceptions of universality in 
international law today.22 In the present era, the United Nations (U.N.)— 
a product of conflicts primarily within and affecting Western civiliza-
tion—evidences the commonly accepted concepts of equality of States, 
particularly in light of the legacy of the League of Nations.23 Although 
the notion of “sovereignty” generates much debate, this Article ad-
dresses the term only with regard to territorial acquisition, with an eye 
to emphasizing the prominent role of Western civilization in establish-
ing the rules of international law that dominate the world today.24 
 Although early civilizations were less conscious of territorial 
boundaries than of common identity, the necessity to hold territory 
and defend it against threats inevitably led to defined territories estab-
lished according to the nation-state formula familiar in modern 
times.25 To be sure, it is an observable fact that civilizations tend to try 
to extend their boundaries as far as possible.26 Under these conditions, 
civilizational expansion originally involved the seizure of territory with-
out regard to whether the territory already belonged to indigenous so-
cieties.27 Nevertheless, norms that now guide international behavior 
began as norms to guide intercivilizational behavior, namely between 
the Egyptian civilization and its Sumeric and Babylonic neighbors.28 
 Territorial sovereignty grants the State an exclusive right of author-
ity and control within that territory.29 The corollary is that no State has 
any right to exercise its authority within the territory of any other 
State.30 Implicit in this definition is the principle that the limits of a 
State’s duties and privileges correspond to the geographic boundaries 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 13–14. 
22 See id. at 39. 
23 See id. at 30–31. 
24 See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International 
Law 17–18 (7th ed. 1997). Throughout the past century, international political coopera-
tion has placed some restrictions upon a State’s sovereignty, as States have become less 
autonomous than they were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Shearer, 
supra note 3, at 90. 
25 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 147–153. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 5. 
29 Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
30 Id. 
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of its territory.31 A State’s territory includes the land itself and all that 
exists above and below it.32 In addition, a State’s territory includes as 
much as twelve miles of sea extending from any coastal border.33 
 The Island of Palmas arbitration provides exceptional insight into 
the role of ancient doctrines in international territorial governance 
and possession.34 The arbitration involved a dispute between the Neth-
erlands and the United States, both of which claimed sovereignty over 
the Island of Palmas.35 The United States acquired the island from 
Spain, which claimed title dating back to 1648 under the doctrine of 
discovery.36 Nevertheless, the Netherlands claimed title via active pos-
session and the effective exercise of sovereign rights over a sufficient 
time to evoke contest.37 The dispute was heard by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, which held that the island belonged to the Nether-
lands.38 The resolution of this dispute placed the burden of contest on 
any State seeking to claim territory actively possessed by another 
State.39 Following the passage of a sufficiently reasonable time period, a 
failure to contest constitutes acquiescence to possession by the sover-
eign that actively controls the disputed territory.40 
 From its origins in early civilizations, territorial acquisition has 
evolved through the millennia from relying primarily on the use of 
brute force to dominate weaker powers to an idealized concept of self-
determination and peaceful transfers that eschews conquest and the 
use of force to acquire territory.41 This Article reviews the manner of 
territorial acquisition in the twenty-first century, focusing on the devel-
                                                                                                                      
31 See Shearer, supra note 3, at 90. As Shearer states, “[t]he basic rights most frequently 
stressed have been those of the independence and equality of states, of territorial jurisdic-
tion and of self-defense and self-preservation.” Id. These rights contrast with several duties 
imposed upon a State, including: avoiding war, completing treaty obligations, and “not 
intervening in the affairs of other states.” Id. 
32 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 76. 
33 Id. 
34 See Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 835. 
35 See id. at 831. 
36 Id. at 837. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 871. 
39 See id. at 870. 
40 See Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 868. 
41 Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New 
World Order 16–17 (1992). There are two different concepts of self-determination. Id. at 
16. The first— “external self-determination” —provides “that people have the right to 
choose their own sovereignty—that is, to be free from external coercion or alien domina-
tion.” Id. The second concept simply requires that people have a meaningful role in the 
political process. Id. at 17. 
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opment of various means of acquisition.42 Beginning with methods de-
veloped millennia ago, this Article charts the shifts in international pol-
icies and socially acceptable standards of territorial acquisition in mod-
ern times, particularly as they are relevant to the role of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the settlement of international 
disputes over territory.43 
 The European discovery of the Americas in 1492 fueled the forma-
tion of international standards of acquisition.44 European States quickly 
attempted to establish themselves in this new, mostly open expanse.45 
Partly as a result of the power struggle prompted by the discovery of the 
vast natural resources available on the new continent, European States 
developed mutually recognizable standards for the acquisition of terri-
tory.46 By establishing a pattern of reciprocal benefits, these interna-
tional rules naturally worked to the advantage of European States 
alone.47 Avoiding conflict among European States enabled each to better 
exploit the new lands in the Western Hemisphere.48 As long as they abid-
ed by the standards established under the newly emergent doctrine of 
discovery, each State could devote its efforts to conquering and coloniz-
ing territories without undue concern about interference from other, 
equally powerful States.49 These standards persisted and generally re-
mained the primary methods for acquiring territory until World War 
.50 
                                                                                                                     
II
 The motive to possess and maintain territory depends on the per-
spective of the would-be possessor. Whereas States have significant in-
terests in maintaining territorial integrity,51 the interests of interna-
tional governing bodies are geared more to preserving stability and 
equality.52 As a result of the modern standards of territorial acquisi-
 
42 See discussion infra Parts I, III. 
43 See discussion infra Part I. 
44 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 27–28 (discussing commissions bestowed on European 
discoverers as “good evidence of the fact that Conquest or Cession was regarded as the 
normal method of acquiring territory already in the possession of native tribes”). 
45 See id. 
46 Korman, supra note 12, at 47–48. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. By working together, the Europeans, through the doctrine of discovery, were 
able both to reduce the costs of such acquisitions by not fighting with each other, and fur-
ther to ease their expansion by effectively creating an oligopsony over terra nullius in the 
Americas. See id. at 42–44. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 135–36. 
51 Shearer, supra note 3, at 90. 
52 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (indicating that one purpose of the U.N. is “to maintain 
international peace and security . . . .”). 
2012] The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition 7 
tion—which have become, for the most part, internationally accepted 
norms of behavior for States—individual States’ ability to acquire new 
territory is limited.53 Modern standards, at least since the great wars of 
the twentieth century, focus primarily on questions of human rights 
and international treaties to determine territorial title and have done 
way
United States.61 Before considering the relative legitimacy of each peo-
                                                                                                                     
a  with the archaic doctrines of conquest and discovery.54 
 Yet, conflicts continue to arise and territories continue to shift from 
State to State.55 There are several motivations for unilateral deviations 
from international norms, including ethnocultural, religiophilosophi-
cal, and even merely geographic differences, which strain the integrity 
of traditional borders at various times under the continually evolving 
social conditions of the planet’s complex infrastructure of human habi-
tation and interest.56 Self-determination, the central principle of mod-
ern acquisition, provides that certain peoples should have a say in the 
creation of their own governments.57 Modern examples of the exercise 
of self-determination abound. For example, Palestinians have obtained 
recognition from a majority of the world’s States;58 factions within Qué-
bec continue to militate for secession from Canada;59 the people of Dar-
fur demand autonomy from Sudan;60 and Puerto Rico’s independentistas 
continue to advocate peacefully for the island’s independence from the 
 
53 See David Webster, Warfare and the Evolution of the State: A Reconsideration, 40 Am. An-
tiquity 464, 465 (1975). 
54 See Korman, supra note 12, at 133. 
55 See Lea Brilmayer, Essay, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 
Yale J. Int’l L. 177, 177 (1991) (noting several modern-day secessionist movements that 
have attempted to redraw political boundaries and create internationally recognized 
States). 
56 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 157, 338. In discussing territorial disputes, 
Malanczuk notes that “legal and political arguments are often used side-by-side. . . . The 
main political arguments which are used in territorial disputes are the principles of geo-
graphical contiguity, of historical contiguity and of self-determination.” Id. at 157. Addi-
tionally, “[t]he problems of minorities and of the special category of indigenous peoples 
. . . have led to a vivid discussion as to whether such groups have a right to self-
determination or whether a new definition of self-determination is required to accommo-
date extreme situations.” Id. at 338. 
57 See Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 177. 
58 See John Cerone, The UN and the Status of Palestine—Disentangling the Legal Issue, Am. 
Soc’y Int’l L. Insights (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110913.cfm. 
59 See Anthony DePalma, Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on Its Own, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1. 
60 Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Steps Up Furious Drive to Stop Rebels, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2011, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/africa/21sudan.html. 
61 Jason Adolfo Otano, Note, Puerto Rico Pandemonium: The Commonwealth Constitution 
and the Compact-Colony Conundrum, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1806, 1806 (2004). 
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ple’s claims, however, it is essential to understand the methods of terri-
torial acquisition that have evolved from ancient origins. 
 Part I addresses the legacy methods used by States in acquiring 
territory under traditional doctrines of occupation, prescription, ces-
sion, and conquest. Part II discusses contemporary issues regarding ter-
ritorial acquisition, including self-determination and specific interna-
tional agreements through efforts by the League of Nations and the 
United Nations. Part III address contemporary jurisprudential and 
pragmatic considerations for territorial acquisition under the principles 
of self-determination and self-defense, the doctrine of uti possidetis, and 
methods for territorial dispute resolution. Finally, this article concludes 
with future considerations for territorial acquisition, including acquisi-
tions of extraterrestrial land and outer space. 
I. The Legacy of Past Methods of Acquisition 
 As Lassa Oppenheim has written, “because the new law has devel-
oped out of the old . . . the old is necessary to an understanding of the 
new.”62 A basic appreciation of the legacy modes of acquisition is neces-
sary to understand the geocentric, modern-day justifications for territo-
rial acquisition. Moreover, despite international regulation, many of the 
ancient methods of acquisition remain.63 Although newer, more hu-
mane methods may supplant the now-antiquated legacy modes of ac-
quisition, twenty-first century modes of acquisition still reflect aspects of 
the archaic models.64 
 Throughout the millennia, the most powerful States have sought 
to expand their empires by seizing new land.65 Such takings were more 
than a simple acquisition of property; rather, when a State laid claim to 
additional increments of territorial jurisdiction, it imposed “a right of 
political control, of ultimate authority,” as opposed to a “right of prop-
erty.”66 As international codes of conduct have developed over the past 
five centuries, European States—and, more recently, States across all 
civilizations—began cooperating to identify ways to agree upon the es-
tablishment of title to lands in a manner that worked to the mutual 
                                                                                                                      
62 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 70, § 242. 
63 See Korman, supra note 12, at 250–55. 
64 See discussion infra Part III. 
65 See generally Barry A. Weinstein, Boundaries and Security in International Law and State 
Practice, 3 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 135 (1992) (discussing trends of territorial acquisition by 
powerful groups throughout history, starting with early nomadic tribes and continuing 
through the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century). 
66 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 403 (emphasis added). 
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benefit of those parties affected by each such case.67 The concept of 
title in this Article thus describes the legal claim to territory by a State.68 
As these customs evolved, five doctrines of acquisition developed:69 the 
doctrines of occupation; prescription; cession; accretion (or acces-
sion);70 and conquest.71 To be sure, this categorical approach often 
oversimplifies the complexities of territorial acquisition and tends to 
obscure the reality of political cross-purposes that have generated most 
                                                                                                                      
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in In-
ternational Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 Conn. J. Int’l L. 1, 2 (2000). Lee’s paper is an 
interesting and base analysis of the utilization of legacy modes of acquisition. See id. The 
paper also discusses uti possidetis and self-determination, and their potential application to 
modern international law. See id. at 11. Touching upon many of the same issues as this 
Article, Lee provides similar, yet alternative, views on territorial acquisition over time. See 
id. at 2. 
70 Although accretion is beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to understand the 
basic doctrine. Accretion describes a geographical process where new land attaches to 
existing land. Shaw, supra note 15, at 498. New formations may be naturally occurring or 
artificial. 1 Oppenheim’s International Law § 258 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992). Examples of natural accretion include land formed at river deltas, other 
newly formed islands and river beds that remain after water ceases to flow. Id. §§ 260–262. 
Examples of artificial accretion include “embankments, breakwaters, dykes, and the like 
. . . .” Id. § 259. 
In Nebraska v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the doctrine of accretion (and its 
sister doctrine of avulsion) to settle a border dispute between two states: 
 It is settled law that when grants of land border on running water, and the 
banks are changed by that gradual process known as “accretion,” the riparian 
owner’s boundary line still remains the stream, although, during the years, by 
this accretion, the actual area of his possessions may vary. . . . 
 It is equally well settled, that where a stream, which is a boundary, from 
any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of 
channel works no change of boundary; and that the boundary remains as it 
was, in the center of the old channel, although no water may be flowing 
therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in the law, 
“avulsion.” . . . 
 These propositions, which are universally recognized as correct where the 
boundaries of private property touch on streams, are in like manner recog-
nized where the boundaries between States or nations are, by prescription or 
treaty, found in running water. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds 
ground, leaves the boundary still the center of the channel. Avulsion has no 
effect on boundary, but leaves it in the center of the old channel. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Such is the received rule of the law of nations on this point, as laid down 
by all the writers of authority. 
143 U.S. 359, 360–62 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 
71 See Seokwoo, supra note 69, at 2. 
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significant territorial conflicts over the past five centuries.72 Moreover, 
some traditional modes of acquisition are archaic by today’s standards 
and are unlikely to emerge as justifications for future title acquisi-
tions.73 In fact, judicial proceedings in both international and national 
courts tend to identify more than one mode of acquisition, and differ-
ent categories of justification rarely reinforce one another; instead, they 
tend to generate vexingly conflicting conclusions in each case.74 In or-
der to ascertain title, and thus recommend granting it to a single party, 
it is necessary for a tribunal to disentangle all of the categories and de-
termine which category governs the facts.75 Hence, in the present dis-
cussion, some cases arise in multiple sections, and a discussion of each 
category of acquisition is necessary for a full understanding of the im-
plications of each case.76 Moreover, an understanding of traditional 
categories provides a useful basis for discussing modern acquisitions. 
A. The Doctrine of Occupation 
 For practical purposes, the doctrine of occupation depends inti-
mately on the doctrine of discovery.77 Occupation requires settlement 
of non-appropriated territory by a State, with the intent of incorporat-
ing the territory into the national domain and exercising sovereignty 
over it.78 Although European powers permitted simple discovery by 
other European States into the eighteenth century, title claims eventu-
ally required occupation of discovered lands.79 States often manifested 
occupation by installing a defensible fort on the land to demonstrate 
their ability to safeguard the land from indigenous societies and foreign 
                                                                                                                      
72 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 127 (6th ed. 2003). 
73 See id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 Cf. Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America 
Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands 127–37 (2005) (discussing how the 
U.S. Supreme Court wrestled with reconciling the doctrines of discovery and occupation 
through disputes regarding Native American title to land). From the discovery of previ-
ously unknown territories came significant rights to title, including rights of occupation. 
See Shaw, supra note 15, at 504. 
78 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 405. 
79 Id. at 404–05. 
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invaders.80 Simply planting the State’s flag on the unoccupied land, 
however, could suffice to effectuate occupation.81 
 This doctrine has become an obsolete form of territorial acquisi-
tion82 for the simple reason that no habitable land remains open for 
possible occupation or discovery.83 While searching for a new route to 
India, Christopher Columbus “discovered” —at least, from a European 
perspective—the Americas, and the doctrines of discovery and occupa-
tion emerged as integral parts of exploration and acquisition.84 The 
original theory of discovery as a justification for territorial acquisition 
depended on a civilization-centric theory of information.85 That is, the 
question of prior habitation depended on information available to 
members of Western civilization—namely, the European powers.86 In 
the hands of a non-Western civilization—such as the Islamic, Sinic, or 
Far Eastern87—such information did nothing to influence European 
perceptions on the matter of this important tenet of international 
law.88 An alternative expression of this fact is that, at the time, interna-
tional law was fundamentally European law—and, indeed, only Western 
European law.89 If a non-European power ultimately adopted the same 
theory, it could by such means gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the Europeans 
and possibly benefit in terms of its own quests for territorial expan-
sion.90 For example, the Russian Empire—categorized by Arnold J. 
Toynbee as part of the Orthodox civilization distinct from Western civi-
lization91—eventually adopted this theory.92 Despite its obsolescence, 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. at 252. 
81 Shaw, supra note 15, at 504. Discoverers initially claimed monumentally broad 
swaths of land on behalf of their nations, as, for example, when Cabot claimed the entirety 
of North America by sighting it from a ship in 1497. Lindley, supra note 4, at 130. 
82 R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law 20 (1963). 
83 See id. 
84 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 404 (“Occupation as a title to territory obtained its im-
portant place in international law in connection with the claims of existing European 
states to acquisitions of territory in the New World opened up by explorers after the dis-
covery of the American continent in the fifteenth century . . . .”). 
85 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 20. 
86 See id. 
87 See 1 Toynbee, supra note 11, at 129 (listing these three civilizations, among others, 
as non-Western). 
88 See Korman, supra note 12, at 45. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 65. 
91 See id.; see 1 Toynbee, supra note 11, at 133. 
92 Id. 
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an understanding of the doctrine of occupation is crucial to the mod-
ern resolution of territorial disputes.93 
1. Colonization and the Doctrine of Occupation 
a. The Americas 
 The European discovery of the Americas in the late fifteenth cen-
tury presented novel challenges to the European powers’ pursuit of 
territorial acquisition that would minimize conflicts with other Euro-
pean powers.94 The enduring legacy of the boundaries drawn during 
the original European occupation of the Americas has had an enor-
mous effect on the identity and geography of the resulting States due to 
the use by the former colonies of the doctrine of uti possidetis to formal-
ize their boundaries upon independence.95 In many cases in the 
Americas, the European powers relied on the doctrine of conquest to 
acquire new territory and assert authority over indigenous societies; 
however, conquest alone was insufficient to establish title to the lands.96 
 The doctrine of discovery permitted Europeans to take control of 
land in the Americas by giving “title to the government by whose sub-
jects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European 
governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”97 If a 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). In Mabo (No. 2), the High 
Court of Australia faced the question of occupation in determining aboriginal rights to the 
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ible information is somewhat sparse. 
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and Acquisitive Prescription, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 25, 41–42 (2005). 
95 John Duncan, Uti Possidetis: Is Possession Really Nine-Tenths of the Law? The Acquisition of 
Territory by the United States: Why, How, and Should We? 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 513, 515–18 
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lish (“so you have possessed”) and implies uti possidetis (“so you shall [continue to] possess”). 
Id. at 516. The doctrine suggests that “administrative boundaries will become international 
boundaries when a political subdivision or colony achieves independence.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1686 (9th ed. 2009). 
96 Korman, supra note 12, at 44. 
97 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). 
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European State discovered terra nullius, that State had a claim to the 
territory against all other European States and could take title to the 
land by way of the doctrine of occupation.98 “It was a right which all 
[European States] asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of 
which, by others, all assented.”99 Hence, title could be established upon 
discovery by building some form of settlement in the territory.100 
 After the European discovery of the Americas, Papal grants and 
the doctrine of discovery were the initial means of providing rights of 
acquisition for terra nullius, or “no man’s land.”101 Terra nullius is land 
that is, at least in theory, not possessed by another State.102 To the Eu-
ropean powers, it referred generally to land free from the possession of 
other European powers.103 In 1492, the Pope granted the right to con-
quer the Western Hemisphere to Portugal and Spain, defining for each 
State a general area of dominion.104 Under the authority of the Dona-
tion of Constantine, the Pope claimed the power to establish for Chris-
tian rulers the right to acquire territory from and rule over the “hea-
thens and infidels” that sparsely populated the Western Hemisphere.105 
Many resisted this Papal power, however; indeed, several European 
States ignored the grants of territory and made forays into new conti-
nents despite of the Papal edicts.106 Eventually, the doctrine of discov-
ery developed to regulate the problems with Papal grants.107 
 The ability to claim land through simple discovery quickly led to a 
proliferation of claims by mere sightings from marine vessels.108 To ad-
dress this potential issue, beginning in the eighteenth century European 
States refused to recognize title by discovery alone.109 European leaders 
realized that to continue to avoid mutual conflict, it would be necessary 
                                                                                                                      
98 See id. 
99 Id. 
100 Lindley, supra note 4, at 141. 
101 Id. at 124–25. 
102 Korman, supra note 12, at 43. 
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104 Lindley, supra note 4, at 124–26. 
105 Id. at 124. 
106 Id. at 126–28; Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 42. Certain European powers and indige-
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107 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 129–30. 
108 See id. at 130–31. 
109 See id. at 132. 
14 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:1 
to condition title on something more than a mere sighting by sea.110 
Accordingly, occupation became a requirement for a legitimate claim of 
title.111 The doctrine of discovery remained important, though: discov-
ery of terra nullius permitted a State to claim temporary title, adverse to 
other States, until it was feasible to establish occupation.112 
 The guiding requirement for recognition of occupation was that 
there be “sufficient governmental control to afford security to life and 
property.”113 In the early days of European colonization, this often re-
quired building a defensible fort, but as the period continued, more was 
necessary.114 Often, acquisition by occupation was possible only if the 
occupying power built and maintained a colony.115 Once the territory 
was sufficiently occupied, it fell under the sovereignty of the occupying 
power, and claims by other European States were barred thereafter.116 
b. Africa 
 Drawing from their experiences in colonizing the Americas, the 
European powers applied the same doctrines of acquisition to the colo-
nization of Africa.117 The Final Act of the Berlin Conference formalized 
the doctrines of acquisition.118 However, the Final Act bound only the 
parties to the agreement and applied only to new cases of occupation on 
the coasts of Africa.119 The Final Act enumerated three criteria for effec-
tuating title by way of the doctrine of occupation: (1) furnishing notice 
to interested powers, (2) physical possession of the territory, and (3) es-
tablishment of a government sufficient to protect the rights of citizen-
subjects.120 The third criterion required the signatory States to establish 
authorities to ensure the freedom of trade and transit.121 As in the 
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111 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 404. 
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Americas, international law permitted a period of time between the origi-
nal discovery and the establishment of effective occupation.122 When 
necessary, reliance on the doctrine of cession—as opposed to the doc-
trine of conquest commonly invoked during the colonization of the 
Americas—often effectuated the transfer of title from indigenous socie-
ties.123 Acquisitions under the doctrine of cession involved the transfer of 
territory by treaty.124 Eventually, the doctrine of occupation, as the Euro-
pean powers came to understand it, extended beyond the coastal regions 
and governed the acquisition of territory in the African interior.125 
c. Greenland 
 As recently as 1933, acquisition by occupation played an important 
role in determining sovereignty over a portion of Greenland.126 In Le-
gal Status of Eastern Greenland, decided by the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice (PCIJ), the court determined that the degree of oc-
cupation necessary to exercise a claim of title over any land was 
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123 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 166–68 (discussing instances in which territory was 
formally ceded to European States through international agreements). The cessions util-
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124 See id. at 166. 
125 See id. at 148. In a dispute between Portugal and Great Britain over the central-
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the Berlin Conference did not change any of the principles of occupation in the interior 
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ample, agreements in 1898 and 1902 with Russia and various Western States, respectively, 
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126 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 
53, at 22 (Apr. 5). 
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measured by whether a State exerted “effective authority” over the dis-
puted territory.127 In the case, Norway claimed title based on the doc-
trine discovery, arguing that the territory at issue was terra nullius be-
cause Denmark refrained from establishing manifest occupation, and 
enunciating its intent to occupy.128 Denmark objected, claiming that 
the reason it refrained from colonizing the land was that the nature of 
the terrain itself prevented colonization.129 It claimed that it had in-
deed exercised sovereignty by way of continuous, peaceful, and undis-
puted protective authority over the land:130 Denmark had explored the 
coasts, established a trading settlement, and mentioned its ownership 
of Greenland in treaties with Norway.131 On the basis of these contacts, 
Denmark proved effective authority and convinced the PCIJ to rule in 
its favor, thereby defeating Norway’s claim of terra nullius.132 
                                                                                                                     
2. Rights of Indigenous Peoples Under the Doctrine of Occupation 
 A necessary facet of the doctrine of occupation is the discovery of 
uninhabited terra nullius.133 The concept of terra nullius, however, was 
veritably a legal fiction.134 Specifically, terra nullius reflected only the 
Europeans’ perception of “no man’s land.”135 Indeed, a great number 
of indigenous residents often occupied the lands purportedly “discov-
ered” by the European powers.136 History shows that the presence of 
indigenous peoples failed to dissuade the European powers from stak-
ing claims to these lands as terra nullius.137 To prevail on a claim of dis-
covery and occupation of terra nullius, disputants fashioned creative 
arguments to distinguish terra nullius from occupied areas, and thereby 
to determine the rights of indigenous societies.138 
 
 
127 See id. at 75. 
128 Id. at 44. 
129 See id. at 49. 
130 Id. at 44–45. 
131 Id. at 33, 44. 
132 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 71–72. 
133 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 2. 
134 See Mabo (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR at 40–42. 
135 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 18, 20. 
136 See id. at 24–44 (examining the practices of States seeking to occupy already-
inhabited lands). 
137 See id. at 26, 34. 
138 See generally Robertson, supra note 77 (offering a comprehensive analysis of the 
European discovery and occupation of the United States and early interpretations of the 
rights of Native Americans by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, and various U.S. 
States). In his study of the facts surrounding Johnson v. M’Intosh, Robertson paints a de-
tailed picture of the circumstances surrounding the case as it transpired through the U.S. 
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 When the European powers landed in the Americas, they encoun-
tered indigenous people. These societies differed significantly from 
those in Western Europe,139 and Europeans quickly devised an array of 
approaches for dealing with them.140 Some early approaches, including 
those of Franciscus a Victoria, conceded that the indigenous societies 
had sovereignty over their territory.141 If, however, the indigenous so-
cieties hindered religious teachings or the buildup of European colo-
nies, the King of Spain had the right to acquire sovereignty over them 
through the doctrine of conquest.142 In 1493, Pope Alexander VI 
granted Spain and Portugal the right to conquer indigenous societies 
in the Americas.143 The Pope proposed an alternative argument— 
namely, that if the indigenous societies lacked a territorially defensive 
governmental structure, then those societies had no rights to their ter-
ritories.144 Other approaches set forth the concept of a “Family of Na-
tions.”145 To be a member of the Family, indigenous societies had to 
have a form of government that advanced beyond a tribal level.146 The 
indigenous government and society had to exist within defined, de-
fended territory in accordance with the European model of territorial 
definition.147 
 Under this definition, however, the European powers precluded 
many tribes in the Americas from claiming territorial sovereignty de-
spite claims that they possessed a governmental structure that delimited 
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and defended specifically defined territory.148 International law in Eu-
rope emerged as an understanding among nation-states circumscribed 
by political boundaries; it has never condoned granting official recog-
nition of title to “wandering tribes or even [to] settled peoples whose 
civilization was regarded as below the European standard.”149 In es-
sence, this meant that if a people never adopted a formal practice of 
precisely delimiting the boundaries of their territory in the European 
manner of possession, then the territory was considered by European 
States not to be possessed.150 
 Given the difficulties inherent in any objective attempt to deter-
mine the nature of foreign indigenous society’s government and terri-
torial philosophy, the European powers ultimately determined that oc-
cupation was, by definition, a right for them to wield over all foreign 
peoples.151 The European powers reasoned that the concept of strictly 
delimited boundaries, subject to a concomitant burden of active de-
fense, constituted a uniquely Christian political philosophy.152 Any 
lands that fell outside the domains of “a Christian prince” constituted 
“‘territorium nullius’ subject to acquisition by Papal grant or by discovery 
and occupation without regard to the wishes of the native inhabi-
tants.”153 The Europeans, thus, leveraged this doctrine unilaterally and 
without regard for the wishes of indigenous societies.154 Over time, the 
occupation of lands deemed terra nullius expanded vastly, as the Euro-
pean powers recognized only a limited number of non-European gov-
ernments.155 To the Europeans, implicit in the very concept of civiliza-
tion was the European philosophy of territorial integrity.156 No society 
without a similar philosophy could be counted as a member of the 
Family of Nations, or the community of civilized peoples.157 On this 
                                                                                                                      
148 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 406. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
152 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 26. 
153 Korman, supra note 12, at 42 (internal quotations omitted). Some scholars argue, 
however, that actual European practice in the Americas more closely resembled cession or 
conquest, which necessarily acknowledged the existence of indigenous societies but re-
fused to recognize their rights to sovereignty. See id. at 42–44. 
154 Id. at 41. 
155 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 12. The only governments so recognized were 
those in India, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, China, Japan, Burma, Siam (currently Thai-
land), and Ethiopia. Id. 
156 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 18–19. 
157 See id. at 20. 
2012] The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition 19 
basis, the Europeans concluded that such people lacked any moral 
right to self-determination.158 
                                                                                                                     
 In later centuries, the doctrine of occupation, premised on the 
fictitious association between civilization and territorial delimitation, 
became obsolete as undiscovered territories became scarce; European 
hegemonies occupied all known lands that lacked a powerful de-
fender.159 Despite the eventual obsolescence of the doctrine of occupa-
tion, the concept of terra nullius survives today, and has appeared in 
modern cases involving prior takings of land.160 In Western Sahara, the 
ICJ issued an advisory opinion regarding whether territory was terra 
nullius when it was established as a Spanish colony.161 On behalf of Al-
geria, Ambassador Mohammed Bedjaoui argued that terra nullius “ef-
fectively constituted the legal spearhead of European colonization.”162 
In its determination of the validity of the occupation, the ICJ ruled that 
“a cardinal condition” to support any claim to territory by way of the 
doctrine of occupation is that the land in question be terra nullius—a 
territory belonging to no-one—at the time of the act alleged to consti-
tute the ‘occupation.’”163 Restricting the meaning of the term terra nul-
lius, the ICJ held that the land in question was not terra nullius when 
Spain sought to occupy it, because one or more peoples, “which, if no-
madic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs 
competent to represent them,” already dwelled there.164 This repre-
sented a fundamental shift between the Eurocentric and geocentric 
conceptions of the doctrine of occupation; it was the first time interna-
tional law was interpreted explicitly to eschew the Eurocentric philoso-
phy requiring territorial delimitation and the burden of defense to es-
tablish a people’s rights to self-determination.165 
 More recently, in Mabo v Queensland (No. 2), the High Court of Aus-
tralia decided a highly publicized terra nullius case in which it deter-
mined that title to land claimed by the British actually remained with 
indigenous societies unless the British or a successor government (Aus-
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tralia in this case) had properly extinguished the indigenous title.166 
The issue arose when members of the indigenous societies argued that 
the land in question, which the Australian government had claimed was 
terra nullius, actually constituted an inhabited area.167 The High Court 
of Australia held that title remained in the indigenous societies’ hands 
unless the government had explicitly extinguished that right.168 This 
case, therefore, established a compromise precedent between the origi-
nal Eurocentric premise of territorial delimitation and burden of de-
fense, and the radically new premise of political organization intro-
duced in Western Sahara.169 Specifically, the difference now lies in 
whether the occupying power formally (de jure) enunciated the extinc-
tion of the indigenous people’s right to a defined territory.170 This 
compromise legitimated the Eurocentric theory that justified European 
conquest in past centuries on the theory that no meaningful opportu-
nity existed for further conquest.171 
 Acquisition via the doctrine of occupation remains an integral part 
of the system of international law that emerged from Western civiliza-
tion’s preference for hegemony.172 Though antiquated as a mode of 
accumulating territory, the doctrine, which has evolved over the centu-
ries, is very much alive in long-standing modern territorial disputes.173 
From the early stages of the doctrine’s evolution, that allowed vast 
claims of title regardless of whether the expansive power actually colo-
nized the land, to later stages, that required colonization followed by a 
burden to determine whether the affected peoples constituted a preex-
isting society recognizable in European territorial theory, the doctrine 
eventually evolved to include more generalizable considerations of the 
right of self-determination for indigenous societies.174 Issues regarding 
prior takings of territory by occupation continue to arise in modern 
courts, and courts today must adjudicate the meaning and breadth of 
occupation as a justification for territorial acquisition.175 
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B. The Doctrine of Prescription 
 Prescription involves “[t]he effect of the lapse of time in creating 
and destroying rights.”176 Prescriptive title arises when there is no evi-
dence of title under the doctrines of occupation, conquest, or cession; 
the territory in question has been under continuous and undisputed 
control long enough to effectively establish a new State; and, the inter-
national community has come to accept the government as legitimate 
in practice.177 Three criteria are necessary to establish prescription. 
First, there must be effective control.178 Second, this control must be 
present for a sufficient period to constitute general acceptance of the 
control among members of the international community.179 Third, nei-
ther the original State nor third-party States must contest this con-
trol.180 If “immemorial possession” occurs, such that the origin of title is 
unclear, then title is generally presumed to be valid.181 
 Prescriptive title may also be established when title is defective or 
unlawful.182 If a State has effectively and peaceably controlled the terri-
tory for a sufficient period, the doctrine of prescription can remedy 
defects in title.183 The crucial distinction between the doctrines of oc-
cupation and prescription is that under the former the territory must 
originally have constituted terra nullius, while under the latter the terri-
tory formerly belonged to another State.184 Although the doctrine of 
prescription closely resembles the doctrine of adverse possession, they 
differ in that under the doctrine of prescription the original title hold-
er must have acquiesced.185 Under the doctrine of prescription, the 
claim to territory must be uncontested186 If a third State disputes the 
claim of the State claiming title by prescription, title to the territory is 
imperfectible.187 For example, in Chamizal the International Boundary 
Commission determined that the United States lacked a basis upon 
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which to claim territory via the doctrine of prescription because Mex-
ico refused to acquiesce to the claim of the United States.188 
 The archetypal example of acquisition under the doctrine of pre-
scription is the case of Island of Palmas.189 In its opinion, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration determined that, although Spain had some claim 
to the island as a result of having discovered it in 1648, title actually be-
longed to the Netherlands.190 Here, Spain had discovered the island 
and received inchoate title, but never actually occupied it.191 Thus, al-
though Spain claimed ownership, the Netherlands established a suffi-
ciently substantial settlement on the island to constitute occupation.192 
That is, under the doctrine of prescription the Netherlands established 
“continuous and peaceful display of State authority” on the island.193 In 
the eyes of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it was sufficient for 
purposes of establishing title for the Netherlands to display occasional 
artifacts of direct and indirect authority over the island, despite the fact 
that such activity fell short of the definitional requirement of continu-
ous and numerous displays.194 The difference between the Spanish and 
Dutch claims to the Island of Palmas thus consisted of Spain’s mere 
claim to title compared with the Netherland’s manifestation of title to 
any third party that might go so far as to observe the island’s self-
evident ascription.195 
 The doctrine of prescription was also relevant in Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland.196 Here, the PCIJ determined that, in order to show 
title via the doctrine of prescription, it was necessary to demonstrate 
two conditions: first, a party must show “the intention and will to act as 
sovereign,” and, second, it must show “some actual exercise or display 
of such authority.”197 Denmark provided persuasive evidence of both 
conditions.198 The shift away from the necessity for substantial occupa-
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tion and toward the necessity to produce an unambiguous display of 
ascription relied on the limiting characteristics of the lands in ques-
tion.199 In both Island of Palmas and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the 
land in question posed obvious obstacles—geological, climatological, 
and geographical—to substantial occupation, such that the courts 
needed an alternative theory that accommodated these natural limita-
tions while preserving the burden of demonstrable commitment to 
ownership on the part of the claimants.200 
 Although a State with a claim to territory generally must consent 
before it is possible to grant prescription to the land, a State cannot 
wait indefinitely to object.201 In the 1959 case of Sovereignty over Certain 
Frontier Land, the Boundary Commission of 1843 had previously deter-
mined the allocation of territory among the relevant States.202 Later, at 
the Convention of 1892, Belgium asserted sovereignty over some dis-
puted territory.203 Although the Netherlands had notice of this claim, it 
refrained from repudiating it until 1922.204 As a result of this delay, the 
ICJ found for Belgium.205 By comparison, the Chamizal opinion found 
that the United States had no legitimate basis to exercise prescription 
over territories that Mexico also claimed.206 In Chamizal, the United 
States and Mexico disputed their common border in certain places.207 
When the United States claimed prescriptive title based on “undis-
turbed, uninterrupted, and unchallenged possession,” Mexico disputed 
this and showed that it had already challenged the boundaries in dip-
lomatic circles.208 The arbitrators thus denied prescriptive title on the 
grounds that Mexico had already challenged the U.S. claim.209 
C. The Doctrine of Cession 
 Acquisition under the doctrine of cession occurs when one State 
transfers land to another State via treaty.210 It may occur by purchase, as 
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occurred with the Louisiana Purchase.211 It can also occur by exchange, 
as evidenced by the 1890 cession by Great Britain of the island of Hel-
goland to Germany in exchange for territory adjoining German East 
Africa.212 Alternatively, a peace treaty may govern the transfer of land, 
such that the value-in-exchange consists of the agreement to a perma-
nent cessation of hostilities.213 Cession creates “the formal transfer 
from one state to another of the sovereignty over a definite area of ter-
ritory.”214 The doctrine of cession is the only mode of acquisition that 
requires the enunciated intentions of at least two States.215 The receiv-
ing State must manifestly intend to receive the land and subsequently 
establish sovereignty.216 Likewise, the ceding State must manifestly in-
tend to transfer the land and relinquish all claims of sovereignty.217 
This form of title is derivative, not original.218 Thus, the validity of the 
receiving State’s title is dependent upon the validity of the ceding 
State’s title.219 Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet: No 
party has the power to transfer a right to another that is greater than 
that which he actually possesses.220 
e law. 
                                                                                                                     
 In past centuries, a transfer made under duress—that is, under the 
threat of force—was a valid manner of transferring title.221 For a time, 
tribunals even considered the doctrines of conquest and cession as al-
ternative, coexisting justifications for territorial acquisition.222 The 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), 
however, declared that, “[a] cession by treaty is void where the conclu-
sion of the treaty has been procured by the threat or use of force 
. . . .”223 The author posits that this also constituted a point of departure 
between the former Eurocentric elaborations of international law for 
the purpose of forestalling conflict among the members of Western 
civilization, and the modern recognition that the era of Eurocentric 
international law had ended for the sake of the universality of th
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D. The Doctrine of Conquest 
 The doctrine of conquest is one of the earliest and most prominent 
doctrines of acquisition.224 Title by conquest was perfectible if the con-
quering State declared an intention to conquer, took the territory by 
force, and had the ability to govern it.225 Most States in past centuries 
considered this a valid method of acquisition.226 The European powers 
colonized Asian territories largely via the doctrines of conquest and ces-
sion.227 The British acquisition of India, the Dutch acquisition of the 
Caribbean islands known as the East Indies, and the Russian acquisition 
of most of northern and central Asia are just a few examples.228 More-
over, the strongest European States continued to pursue the conquest of 
the European continent, controverting Eurocentric international law.229 
 The doctrine of conquest gave the victorious State sovereignty over 
the conquered territories and their indigenous societies.230 Winning in 
battle alone, however, was insufficient to transfer title.231 Annexation 
was also necessary to establish sovereignty, and established an expecta-
tion that unambiguous artifacts of annexation would be manifested.232 
The conqueror must intend to govern the territory, have effective pos-
session and control, and no exiled government or allies thereof may 
exist to contest control.233 International law recognized title as valid if 
the conquered State was totally destroyed (debellatio), through a peace 
treaty granting cession, or if the failed State acquiesced.234 If the land 
failed to pass through cession and a peace treaty, however, claimants to 
the land resorted to the doctrine of uti possidetis.235 Further, in the ab-
sence of a treaty, it was necessary to show that the war had completely 
ended, and the defeated society must have surrendered and submitted 
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to the new authority.236 It was necessary to show by evidence that resis-
tance by the opposing society, and any of its allies, had ceased.237 
 The conquering State’s intention is crucial in considerations of 
title under the doctrine of conquest. Although intent may often be in-
ferred from the State’s actions, only some cases of conquest result in 
annexation.238 During World War II,239 the members of the Western-
Orthodox alliance240 “expressly disclaimed the intention of annexing 
Germany, although they had occupied all of Germany’s territory and 
defeated all of Germany’s allies.”241 Thus, in addition to conquering 
the territory, extension of civil administration and incorporation of the 
territory into the acquiring State is necessary for the completion of ti-
tl 42 




rights have become more influential in policy determinations.245 
ties.246 After the war, the international diplomatic community—which, 
                                                                   
243 International law has either entirely extinguished or 
heavily restricted recognition of title under this doctrine.244 These re-
strictions on territorial rights under the doctrine of conquest result 
from shifts in moral views during the twentieth century, as h
II. Segue into Modernism 
 World War I, a Western civilizational conflict, was devastating both 
for European States and for peripheral States affected by the hostili-
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at the time, consisted primarily of Europeans—determined that allow-
ing territorial acquisition as a result of war was an open invitation to 
further conflict.247 States began a series of reforms to disclaim annexa-
tion as a means of resolving conflict, and they proceeded to advance 
the doctrine of self-determination as the basis for forming a political 
State.248 To realize this goal, international organizations like the 
League of Nations were established and tasked with promoting 
eac
me form of effective control to 
sti
                                                                                                                     
p e.249 
 As States began to embrace the doctrine of self-determination as 
the peaceful, and, therefore, proper justification for territorial transfer, 
the legacy doctrines of acquisition quickly began a decline into obsoles-
cence.250 Possession, a common element of the legacy modes, has made 
its way into modern doctrines.251 Specifically, “effective possession and 
control” are requirements for the doctrines of both prescription and 
occupation.252 Although the latter did not require immediate posses-
sion to establish rights to a territory, occupation was required for title 
to be perfected.253 Under the doctrine of prescription, “the intention 
and will to act as a sovereign” was an absolute necessity.254 Under the 
doctrine of conquest, title could only be legitimated by actual posses-
sion of the land or by way of the doctrine of cession.255 Even in the case 
of cession, many authorities required so
ju fy recognition of the acquisition.256 
 States continue to advance legacy modes of acquisition to support 
their claims to territory.257 The rationale for this is simply that modern 
courts continue to look to effective possession as a determinative factor 
in the resolution of a case.258 In Minquiers and Ecrehos, the ICJ looked to 
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numerous treaties to determine possession.259 France and Britain con-
tested title to fishing islets in the English Channel.260 After reviewing 
numerous treaties and negotiations concerning the islets that dated 
from feudal times, the ICJ looked to which State could demonstrate the 
most effective possession.261 Ultimately, having determined that its ac-
n
ents for pos-
ally consolidate into a title.”271 In making its ruling, the tribunal stated 
                                                                                                                     
tio s better demonstrated effective possession, the ICJ ruled for Great 
Britain.262 
 Relatedly, former ICJ Justice de Visscher suggested a non-trad- 
itional mode of acquisition, namely, consolidation of title.263 Under this 
theory, claim to title is a determined by a variety of factors, and the ju-
dicial authority would attempt to identify a coherent logic across possi-
bly conflicting doctrines.264 Tribunals would consider evidence of rec-
ognition, estoppel, and acquiescence.265 This complex relationship had 
“the effect of attaching a territory . . . to a given state.”266 Possession is a 
heavy consideration in consolidation of title.267 Under the theory, pos-
session “is the foundation and the sine qua non of this process of con-
solidation,” as long as the possession is of sufficiently long duration.268 
In this context, possession is different from the requirem
session under the doctrine of prescription, as no requirement exists 
that possession be manifestly peaceful or uncontested.269 
 In the Eritrea-Yemen arbitration, a proceeding to resolve a title 
dispute over the Red Sea Islands, there was very little evidence of which 
State controlled governmental functions on the islands.270 The tribunal 
thus applied the theory of consolidation of title, specifically examining 
evidence of the “demonstration of use, presence, display of governmen-
tal authority, and other ways of showing a possession which may gradu-
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that under modern international law, “an intentional display of power 
and authority over the territory . . . on a continuous and peaceful basis” 
cri
g territory; only the rationales behind 
the acquisitions have shifted.276 
uisi-
on 
                                                                                                                     
is tical for territorial acquisition.272 
 Under the legacy doctrine of occupation, effective possession is 
required to perfect title, as this enables a powerful State to exert con-
trol over a smaller nation or tribe.273 Today, traditional modes of acqui-
sition are increasingly becoming obsolete; effective possession, however, 
persists as a central consideration for almost all acquisitions.274 The ob-
solescence of the doctrine of occupation thus fails to nullify the bene-
fits of controlling territory.275 Instead, powerful States retain their abil-
ity to exercise control in acquirin
A. Self-Determination and the End of the Doctrine of Conquest 
 With the advent of international agreements intended to end war 
as a means of resolving disputes, the doctrine of conquest began a de-
cline.277 International organizations like the League of Nations, the 
U.N., and the World Trade Organization (WTO)278 have made acq
ti by “threat or use of force” invalid by international mandate.279 
 The victorious European powers founded the League of Nations 
based in part on U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 
which he proposed in his address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress 
on January 8, 1918.280 The Fourteen Points sought simply to encourage 
lasting peace.281 The final Point called for an international association 
to guarantee “political independence and territorial integrity to great 
and small states alike.”282 The League’s purpose is manifest in Article 10; 
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namely, that the body of States should cooperate “[i]n case of any such 
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression.”283 
 Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant pronounced that 
member States would “respect and preserve as against external aggres-
sion the territorial integrity and existing political independence” of the 
other member States.284 The international community generally agreed 
that Article 10 prohibited acquisition by force and made no exception 
for circumstances, like cases of self-defense, in which the use of force 
would otherwise be acceptable.285 The language of Article 10 carried 
forward to the current Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which requires 





                                                                                                                     
fo e” in any “manner inconsistent with [p]urposes of the United Na-
tions.”286 
 Questions have arisen as to whether it is ever proper to acquire 
territory from an aggressor State that loses a war.287 Great Britain ar-
gued that Article 10 only abolished acquisition by conquest generally, 
but did not prohibit it in all situations—it argued, for example, for an 
exception justifying the acquisition of territory as punishment for ag-
gressions.288 Others argued that if the Council or PCIJ recommended 
an adjustment of borders, then it would be necessary to permit the use 
of force to enforce the judgment.289 Another view was that annexation 
at the end of a conflict was permissible if a League of Nations co
ju fied the war.290 Finally, many authorities read Article 10 as banning 
all acquisitions of territory by force under any circumstances.291 
 The purpose of these post-World War I reforms was to restrict the 
benefits that States stood to receive from war.292 Despite these reforms, 
the members of the Western-Orthodox alliance controlled the disposi-
tion of German territories.293 The victorious powers left Germany large-
ly intact and established the Weimar Republic from the German
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in s.ce
sisted that it was entitled to participate in the system of mandates estab-
lished by the ne ned to join.301 
                                                                                                                     
294 Under the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations con-
trolled Germany’s colonies through the Mandates System.295 
 The Mandates System appointed a “Mandatory State” to adminis-
ter the colonies under a prescribed set of terms, while the League of 
Nations retained ultimate authority.296 The Mandatory State acted as 
trustee of the former colonies when the members of the League of Na-
tions deemed the colonies unable to protect themselves politically.297 
Despite disdainful protests from the international community about 
acquisition by way of the doctrine of conquest, the League of Nations 
effectively permitted such action through the Mandates System by sim-
ply providing formal legitimacy.298 “[T]he Allied victory seemed merely 
to represent a new peak of imperial expansion conducted by the victors 
at the expense of the vanquished.”299 The League of Nations suffered a 
failure in the form of rejection by the U.S. Senate—the same fate suf-
fered by the Treaty of Versailles.300 Nevertheless, the United States in-
w international organization in had decli
B. Annexation Issues During World War II 
 World War II was the result of a plethora of socioeconomic, politi-
cal and other factors that combined to stifle German recovery after 
World War I.302 A major factor traces its origins to World War I, namely, 
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the taking of German territories as sanctions for its role in that war.303 
In addition to the effect of heavy monetary sanctions, the loss of land 
was devastating to the German people.304 Rumors exist to the effect 
that, shortly after signing the Treaty of Versailles, French Marshal Fer-
dinand Foch, an advocate of heavy sanctions on Germany, stated: “This 
is not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years.”305 Sir Winston Chur-
chill was also critical of the methods by which the Armistice sought to 
achieve peace.306 Specifically, he believed that a “cardinal tragedy was 
the complete break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”307 Regarding 
Mein Kampf, Churchill stated that Hitler desired the expansion of Ger-
eatness.308 
rowth of justified actions under the Pact, and yet it fell 
or
                                                                                                                     
many in order to restore the nation’s prior gr
1. The Kellogg-Briand Pact in World War II 
 Between World War I and World War II there were several interna-
tional attempts to discourage war. Prominent among these efforts, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (the Pact), also known as the General Trea-
ty for the Renunciation of War, renounced warfare as a means of resolv-
ing international controversies.309 Although the Pact failed to specify 
that self-defense was an exception, arguably it implied as much.310 
Moreover, the Pact withdrew protection from States that breached the 
Pact.311 Further, the Pact permitted the annexation of territory as a 
sanction against an aggressor State if the international community de-
termined such action was warranted.312 World War II, however, was sup-
posedly the outg
sh t of prohibiting the imposition of forcible territorial changes upon 
an aggressor.313 
 At the close of World War II, the members of the Western-Ortho-
dox alliance redistributed the conquered territories.314 The United 
States put the Pacific Islands under a “strategic trust,” and the Soviet 
 
 The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 provides just one example 
of h y effectively lost their lands following World War I. Id. 
d. 
f War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 5, 
Aug 43, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. 
orman, supra note 12, at 193. 
303 See id. at 54.
ow German
304 See id. at 7. 
305 See i
306 See id. at 10. 
307 Id. 
308 See Churchill, supra note 293 at 57. 
309 General Treaty for Renunciation o
. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 23
310 See K
311 Id. at 198. 
312 Id. 
313 See id. at 199. 
314 See id. at 161–62. 
2012] The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition 33 
Union annexed parts of Poland, the former Prussia, and the Sakhalin 
Islands to the north of Japan.315 The Atlantic Charter encouraged the 
concept of self-determination while suggesting that the members of the 
Western-Orthodox alliance disclaim any rights to the territory that they 
had captured.316 Poland also annexed a portion of Germany in order 
to provide a “short and more easily defensible frontier between Poland 
and Germany.”317 The distribution and annexation of territory after 
World War II seems to indicate that the Kellogg-Briand Pact permitted 
the international community to effect territorial changes.318 Although 
the Pact prohibited individual cases of conquest for territory, the man-
ner in which the victorious powers annexed Germany after World War 




unify States and promote international cooperation for peace and sta-
community agrees to it.31
2. The Role of the U.N. 
 It is human nature to pursue ways to improve one’s comfort and 
security. Applied on a national scale, this tendency can lead to a desire 
to reach out and conquer territory unilaterally, taking from another for 
the unilateral betterment of one’s own State regardless of the expense 
to the affected party.320 In the period of European colonial expansion, 
a common purpose was the acquisition of resources.321 Prior to this pe-
riod, and again after it, the purpose was largely s
th Soviet Union’s dominance of Eastern Europe was intended to se-
cure resources and shore up national security.322 
 The founding members of the U.N. developed that institution to 
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bility.323 The U.N. Charter has at its foundation reforms developed in 
response to the experiences and effects of World War I and World War 
II.324 There is a specific focus on peaceful resolution of international 
disputes and the role of self-determination in acquisitions.325 As noted 
in Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter, a crucial goal of the U.N. is to join 
States together in “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
eted rmination of peoples.”326 
 The U.N. attempted to restrict States’ abilities to conquer foreign 
nations in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.327 Article 2(4) states that 
“[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”328 This construction is clearly similar 
to that of Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter.329 As was the case 
with Article 10, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has been the subject of 
much study and interpretation.330 Most read the resolution as a ban on 
the use of force against any other party subject to two exceptions.331 
First, there is no justification to use force unless it is part of a U.N.-
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authorized collective action to maintain or restore international 
peace.332 Second, self-defense against armed attacks is permissible until 
e U
l to the seriousness of the threat.339 Another ration-
ale for the strict limitations on acquisition by conquest is the right of 
                                                                                                                     
th .N. can intervene to preserve or restore peace and security among 
the disputants.333 
 With regard to acquisition by force, many authorities argue that 
the U.N. Charter admits no circumstances under which it is ever possi-
ble to legitimate the acquisition of territory by threat or actual imposi-
tion of force.334 Hence, when a State acquires territory as a result of 
self-defense, there may be a temporary occupation, but there can be no 
legal transfer of title.335 There are several rationales for this blanket 
prohibition. For example, there are practical restrictions on any realis-
tic ability to expand acquisitional rights.336 Further, a principle of pro-
portionality suggests that any use of force in self-defense must consti-
tute a clear necessity vis-à-vis the degree of the threat faced by the 
defending State.337 One form of evidence of necessity is the immediacy 
of the retaliation.338 Beyond necessity and immediacy, retaliation must 
also be proportiona
self-determination. 
3. Self-Determination and the Expansion of European Hegemony 
 The concept of self-determination is probably the most well-
established feature of the modern philosophy of national rights.340 
Reaching back as far as the North American colonies’ struggle for inde-
pendence within the British realm, and extending to peoples outside 
the boundaries of Western civilization, this concept has become an in-
ternationally recognized rule.341 Its broad acceptance is further evi-
dence of the obsolescence of the doctrine of conquest in the present 
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339 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 905 
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and (b) are not out of proportion to
, supra note 24, at 316–17. 
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day.342 Under this theory, acquisition by force can no longer divest a ter-
ritory’s people of their rights because those rights are conferred inal-
ienably on the original, rightful inhabitants.343 As States began to rec-
ognize this right, opportunities for acquisition by force began to 
diminish substantially.344 In 1970, the Declaration on Principles of In-




 not be the object of acquisition 
her State resulting from the threat or use of force. No 
interference, their political status and to pursue their eco-
In addition to suggesting that any threat or actual imposition of force 
v
ivid
 Viewed two-dimensionally, the Earth possesses a vast but finite sur-
face area.347 States controlling the surface area also control the subter-
                                                                                                                     
ng States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nati
laration on Principles of International Law) determined the foll
ule: 
The territory of a State shall
by anot
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force 
shall be recognized as legal. 
 . . . . 
 By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, with-
out external 
nomic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty 
to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter.345 
oids acquisition of territory, the declaration clearly mandates that in-
d uals should have rights of self-determination.346 
III. Some Jurisprudential and Pragmatic Considerations Today 
 
an, supra note 12, at 228. 
c. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (em-
pha
 in the International 
Sys
342 See Korm
343 See id. at 227. 
344 See id. 
345 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Do
sis added). 
346 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 327. 
347 See The World Factbook, Cent. Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
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persen & Gareth Stansfield, Introduction, in Unrecognized States
tem 1–8 (Nina Caspersen & Gareth Stansfield eds., 2011) (describing the division of 
the Earth’s surface into entities that control delineated territory). 
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ranean soil, and adjacent waters and airspace.348 The Earth is the foun-
dation for international society, which itself is “subject to the ebb and 
flow of political life,” where new States supplant the old.349 When na-
tion-states claim sovereignty over land previously held by predecessor 
states, the international community must decide when and if to accept 
the new claim.350 The decision to accept the new claim is an act of rec-
ognition, a “formal acknowledgement by one state that another state 
exists as a separate and independent government.”351 Note, however, 
that acceptance of a State’s existence does not presuppose official rec-
ognition of the State’s government via diplomatic relations.352 
 appeal to the international community for redress 
A. State vs. Political Recognition 
 Throughout human history, nations have resorted to war to settle 
international disputes, and the relatively new collection of international 
organizations founded with the objective of achieving peace are simply 
incapable of thwarting this inherent human tendency.353 Despite the 
best efforts of these well-intentioned groups, nations will continue to 
attempt to extend their territories and promulgate their beliefs 
through conquest.354 Existing and new nation-states acquire terri-
tory.355 The predecessor State may choose to accept the acquisition of 
territory, or it may
against the acquiring State.356 
 Governments must distinguish between state and political recogni-
tion.357 A lack of diplomatic relations does not mean that States do not 
recognize each other as independent States.358 States need not accord 
formal recognition to any other State, but will treat others as inde-
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pendent State entities that meet with certain requirements.359 Upon 
the occurrence of a transitional event, existing States determine 
whether to recognize the change, and if so, decide on “the kind of legal 
nti
ccomplish a 
                     
e ty” the new State assumes.360 States render such decisions based on 
policy and other political considerations.361 Recognition therefore oc-
curs after the event that purportedly establishes the new nation-state.362 
 Recognition is a crucial factor for prescription.363 As noted previ-
ously, recognition requires that other States recognize a State’s right to 
territory in order to effectuate prescription.364 In the modern context, 
States have sought to justify recognition in cases wherein they had ille-
gally conquered territory but held it indefinitely.365 Although much of 
the international community now rejects the legacy doctrines of justifi-
cation for territorial acquisition, it is necessary to address the fact that 
States will continue to acquire territory even if what they seize lacks in-
ternationally-recognized title.366 If acquisition through force persists 
despite international condemnation, recognition and prescription are 
the two best means of response.367 Eventually, the international com-
munity needs to know who has title to the territory; after all, title must 
belong to someone.368 Permitting the vanquished party to hold de jure 
title could pose significant problems.369 Recognition, which implies 
prescription, is the better doctrine through which to a
transfer of title.370 Scholars have called recognition “the primary way in 
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ational law
ticular factual situ
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gnty is contained in the notion of title,” and discussing recognition as a means of de-
fining territ
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which the international community has sought to reconcile illegality or 
doubt with political reality and the need for certainty.”371 
 Recognition is achievable by the official acknowledgment by a 
number of States that the party in possession should indeed have title to 
the land.372 Several prerequisites are necessary to validate recogni-
tion.373 First, the recognition must consist of an express statement.374 
Second, the conquest must benefit from de jure recognition, rather 
war, an action of conquest and annexation vests title to the territory in 
                                                                                                                     
than simply de facto recognition.375 Third, the new State must be rec-
ognized by third-party States.376 Additionally, the third-party States that 
recognize title must generally have some legal claim to the territory, 
unless “a considerable number of other States have likewise recognized 
title.”377 
 Although the concept of recognition in international affairs is use-
ful for the determination of title, in practice the opposite concept— 
non-recognition—is a more frequent remedy when territory is acquired 
by force.378 Express non-recognition by an exiled government, a third-
party State, or the U.N. acts to bar prescription.379 Affected parties have 
used this doctrine frequently in response to the use of force to seize 
territory.380 The Stimson Doctrine employed the principle of non-
recognition with respect to Japan.381 Specifically, U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry Stimson announced that the United States would refrain from 
granting official approval of Japan’s aggression against China in estab-
lishing a surrogate State in Manchuria.382 The Stimson Doctrine broke 
sharply from the traditional view that, regardless of the legality of the 
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the victor.383 Shortly after the United States enunciated the Stimson 
Doctrine, the League of Nations passed a resolution concurring with 
the notion that stating that States should refrain from recognizing “any 
tua
ncil permitted annexation under the “colonial enclave” 
exception, rather than extending to Goa an official right of self-
det
                                                                  
si tion, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means 
contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations.”384 This directed 
States to assume an obligation to refuse recognition of any territorial 
change undertaken by way of the threat or use of force.385 
 Similarly, the Declaration on Principles of International Law states 
that, “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of 
force shall be recognized as legal.”386 In Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the ICJ validated as a 
governing principle each State’s duty to refrain from granting official 
sanction to an action when the U.N. Security Council has determined 
the action to be illegal.387 The international community, however, has 
often applied the standard inconsistently.388 For example, in 1961, In-
dia invaded the Portuguese colony of Goa,389 claiming that Portugal 
had contravened its obligations under the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and, therefore, 
that Portugal’s possession was illegal.390 Portugal countered that India 
violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter when it forcibly acquired the 
territory.391 When the case came before the U.N. Security Council, the 
Council refused to condemn the act for political reasons.392 Though it 
was feasible to grant the people of Goa the right to form their own gov-
ernment,393 and despite manifest violations of international law by In-
dia, the Cou
ermination.394 This exception applies to annexations wherein the 
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acquired territory shares ethnic and geographic links with the conquer-
ing State.395 
 In the early twentieth century, the United States accepted and 
helped apply Declarative Theory principles toward recognition of new 
States in the Americas and the Caribbean.396 The 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Conven-
tion) established the process, still in use today, for nation-state recogni-
tion under international law.397 Under the Montevideo Convention, 
“[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”398 
Further, the Montevideo Convention delineates between a State’s politi-
cal stature and recognition by other States.399 “The political existence of 
the state is independent of recognition by the other states.”400 Although 
the Montevideo Convention dealt exclusively with States in the Americas 
and the Caribbean, over time its treaty has transformed into a restate-
ment of international law.401 For example, the Montevideo Conven-
tion’s definition of a State survived into the late twentieth century.402 In 
1991, the European Union applied this definition as a basis for recog-
nizing Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia as independent States.403 Swit-
zerland applies the Montevideo Convention’s definition to recognize 
States, but distinguishes state recognition from political recognition.404 
India treats recognition “as a matter of course or routine” once “condi-
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tions of statehood have been fulfilled.”405 Despite the potential 
benefits of non-recognition, it remains inefficient in protecting territo-
al 
na-
tional community came together in condemnation of Iraq and provided 
assistance to Kuwait rce, to restore 
ss
tions of the doctrine occurred during the independence of the States 
                                                                                                                     
ri boundaries. Unless the international community is willing to exert 
enough force on aggressor nations, States will continue to conquer 
neighboring nations in the face of international condemnation.406 
 A prime example of the inefficiency of non-recognition is Israel’s 
conquests in Palestine. In 1967, Israel captured territory that was part of 
the original Mandate for Palestine.407 In 1980, Israel passed an act to 
legalize its annexation of East Jerusalem.408 The U.N. Security Council 
was quick to condemn the act.409 Although most States view the war as 
valid self-defense, none have recognized Israel’s right to title in East Je-
rusalem.410 Despite such international condemnation and use of non-
recognition, Israel continues to hold possession of the territory.411 
There have been more recent examples of the successful use of non-
recognition—namely, the first Gulf War. In that instance, the inter
 in order to expel the aggressing fo
po ession to Kuwait, and to maintain the territorial rights of Iraq.412 
B. The Doctrine of Uti Possidetis 
 Under the doctrine of uti possidetis, colonial boundaries remain 
after a colony achieves independence.413 This doctrine is a reasonable 
solution in the limited context of colonies that become independent 
States.414 The principal goal of uti possidetis is to find political solutions 
to territorial disputes and avoid conflict.415 One of the earliest applica-
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tis since the time of the establishment of European hegemony in America). 
414 See id. at 543. While utilizing uti possidetis is somewhat easy and simplistic in its con-
cept, there are practical concerns that demand a dialectic. See id. Issues such as cultural 
and economic gaps and geographical problems may create a necessity 
ndary lines, rather than leave them to the sim
415 See Bro
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of Central and South America.416 By permitting the new States to adopt 
the boundary lines of the former colonies from which they emerged, 
e 
 Middle East.423 Much of the territory eventually 
ll u
                                                                   
th application of the doctrine prevented border disputes among the 
new States and forestalled further European intervention.417 
 States throughout the world have justified territorial acquisition by 
way of uti possidetis, including the States that emerged from Yugoslavia 
in the latter decades of the twentieth century.418 Although the applica-
tion of the concept is optional in resolving territorial disputes, it can 
reduce conflict in many instances and, therefore, has been a popular 
tool for the demarcation of the boundaries of newly-independent 
States.419 Following World War II, the Western-Orthodox alliance as-
sumed the power of disposition over the defeated regimes.420 They as-
sumed this power to be valid, in fact, regardless of whether the defeated 
State consented.421 An example of such a disposition was the Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916, a secret agreement made between France 
and Great Britain regarding the demarcation of territories in the Mid-
dle East.422 Russia made the secret pact public, but the League of Na-
tions effectively mandated the agreement and imposed it upon the af-
fected nations of the
fe nder the Mandates system, and the Iran-Syria border is a remnant 
of such decisions.424 
 The common result of the application of uti possidetis under the 
Mandates and Trustee Systems was the creation of States based upon 
geographic, rather than cultural, boundaries.425 These unnatural divi-
sions have invited regional infighting in many regions of the world, par-
ticularly in Africa.426 The creation of the U.N. prompted the decoloni-
zation of many regions.427 Many of the colonies under the Mandates 
and Trustee systems obtained rights of self-determination.428 Despite 
the granting of such rights, many States are still an uneasy amalgam of 
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ethnic, religious, or cultural groups.429 The following section addresses 
these problems and explores how increased utilization of self-determin- 
ation rights could assist in reducing ethnically based violence, as af-
fected the Kurds in Iraq, Serbs and Bosnians in Yugoslavia, and other 
peoples in an array of States. The following section also speculates as to 
the e  of 
righ . 
. simply provides 
upon the determination of such controversial issues as the 
en
ffects of a broad recognition of numerous States in observance
ts of self-determination, should such an eventuality come to pass
C. Practical Limitations on Annexation Under Claims of Self-Defense 
 The primary practical restriction on acquisition under the doc-
trine of conquest under the U.N. Charter is the absence of an estab-
lished adjudicative body with power to hear and resolve disputes involv-
ing conquered territory.430 If the U.N. allowed such acquisitions and 
annexations, an international body would have to take responsibility for 
determining whether the taking was just, and if so, how to conclude the 
matter.431 To this author, such a body would necessarily have to be ac-
ceptable to all the parties involved. Currently, the U.N
a framework for the resolution of such conflicts;432 however, it lacks the 
power to abrogate and alter territorial boundaries.433 
 Another practical restriction is that under the U.N. Charter, it is 
impossible to acquire territory through measures of self-defense.434 A 
defending State has no justification for taking any of the territory of the 
aggressor after it successfully repels an attack.435 Were it possible for 
one State to acquire land from an aggressor State, it could discourage 
States from invading other nations.436 If the international community 
allowed such takings after a war, however, it would make “questions of 
title depend 
id tification of the aggressor and the limits and meaning of self-
defense.”437 
 Finally, the Vienna Convention voids any treaty into which a State 
enters under the threat of force.438 That is, quid pro quo annexation, 
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in which “quid” is the victor’s agreement to sign a treaty to cease hostili-
ties, constitutes duress and is consequently invalid because territorial 
annexation between two parties at war lacks innate recognition by the 
internatio rom self-
defense woul t to end 
e w
l recognition immediately after 
or
                                                                                                                     
nal community.439 Thus, any annexation resulting f
d almost certainly be formalized in an agreemen
th ar, and would therefore be void under the Vienna Convention.440 
D. Self-Determination Under Modern International Law 
 The principle of self-determination441 allows a people to deter-
mine without coercion its preferred form of government.442 The con-
cept has evolved through a number of stages and is still the subject of 
much contention.443 The principle of self-determination was a key fac-
tor in the foundation of the United States.444 President Thomas Jeffer-
son wrote in the Declaration of Independence that “Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed.”445 Although not the first group to use the term “self-
determination,” the Bolshevik revolutionaries who founded the Soviet 
Union were the first to encompass within the term a view of national 
equality wherein States have sovereign equality and the validity of a 
claim for self-determination depends upon the oppression of the 
claimant group.446 For Western European advocates of “self-determin-
ation” as a term encompassing government by popular consent, a trans-
fer of territory between States is valid only with the consent of the peo-
ple.447 Although President Wilson’s lofty views on self-determination, 
which were specifically aimed at peoples outside the boundaries of 
Western civilization, lacked internationa
W ld War I, the international community has since begun recognizing 
more human rights—certainly including, but likewise moving beyond, 
the right of self-determination itself.448 
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 Following World War II, the right of self-determination continued to 
evolve, starting with the U.N.’s Trustee System, modeled after the League 
of Nations’ Mandates System, which placed certain territorial regions 
under a Trust.449 The ICJ granted the Moroccan Sahara a right of self-
determination in Western Sahara.450 Under the U.N.’s system, there were 




Despite the apparent contradictions in U.N. documents, the U.N.’s ac-
tions over the past few years seem to indicate an expansion of self-
                                                                                                                     
fo  of government: (1) integration of the colony into an existing State, 
(2) creation of a sovereign, independent State, or (3) any other condi-
tion or status that grows out of an uncoerced decision by the people.451 
 Initially, international law limited the principle of self-determin-
ation to newly decolonized States.452 Those States under the Mandates 
or Trust Systems clearly had a right to self-determination in determining 
their new governments.453 It is unclear, however, whether non-colonial 
States have the same rights to self-determination.454 What is also unclear 
is whether a colonial State may rely on the right to self-determination 
anew after its initial reliance, as might occur if a different indigenous 
group asserted independence from the post-colonial governm
A ough the re-utilization of self-determination in forming govern-
ments could become problematic, peoples within established States are 
increasingly beginning to demand rights of self-determination.456 
 A major concern regarding the principle of self-determination as it 
applies to non-colonial States is that it may conflict directly with certain 
agreements among States regarding territorial integrity.457 It is often the 
case that the principle of self-determination is manifest within the same 
document that requires respect for territorial integrity.458 Several U.N. 
resolutions recognize a right of self-determination to certain peoples.459 
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determination to peoples that inhabit lands beyond both the States and 
colonies of Western civilization, or even those that have exercised their 
n the 
Granting of In les.467 
lishing a friendly democratic government that would reject terror-
                                                                                                                     
right of self-determination independent of international influence.460 
 This expansion is apparent in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.461 This document specifically expresses a right 
of self-determination to indigenous societies.462 Although the U.N. 
lacks the ability to convey title, mainly due to its lack of status as a terri-
torial sovereign, and only possesses the power of recommendation, it 
has been common for an international agency to dispose of Mandate 
and Trustee territory through the collective action of States.463 Accord-
ing to Ian Brownlie, the right to terminate mandates may actually fall 
within the U.N.’s powers.464 The ICJ has also spoken out on applying 
the principle of self-determination to non-colonial territories.465 In a 
1949 advisory opinion, the court stated that “‘[u]nder international 
law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, 
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its du-
ties.’”466 According to Brownlie, this confers upon the U.N. some im-
plied right of territorial disposition under the Declaration o
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peop
E. Self-Determination and the Second Gulf War 
 The most recent war in Iraq provides fairly clear evidence of why 
attempting to create rights of self-determination is a difficult proposi-
tion in reality. Although the original rationales given to justify the inva-
sion of Iraq included the goal of giving the Iraqi people rights of self-
determination, the United States also invaded for the purpose of estab-
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ism.468 The goal of establishing democracy bears a close relationship to 
that of supporting self-determination; it is often assumed that a free 
people will select a democratic form of government, perhaps because it 
is counterintuitive that a newly-freed people would reject freedom by 
popular vote.469 Thus, in a very real sense, the invasion of Iraq sought 
to permit self-determination.470 
 There are, however, many concerns attendant to “delivering” self-
determination.471 There are practical concerns regarding the cost of 
this enterprise, both from the perspective of the invading power, which 
must bear the cost of invasion, and from that of the invaded country, 
that is forced to suffer the inevitable collateral damage of even the most 
advanced, targeted campaign.472 There are also theoretical concerns, 
including whether any State has a unilateral right to invade another for 
the purpose of establishing the conditions for self-determination.473 In 
the case of Iraq, another rationale for the invasion was based on Ameri-
can claims of self-defense; the United States purportedly feared that al 
Qaeda might find safe haven with the Iraqi regime of President Sad-
dam Hussein and pose an intensified threat.474 The basis for this per-
ception was the Iraqi leadership’s refusal to cooperate with U.N. weap-
ons inspectors in their attempt to verify the status of Iraq’s arsenal of 
chemical weapons that had previously been used both against the 
Kurds in northern Iraq and against the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war.475 
The Iraqi regime’s flouting of the U.N.’s legitimate function seemed to 
offer clear evidence to national intelligence agencies around the world 
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that Iraq possessed a dangerous stockpile of chemical weapons—and, 
hence, posed a danger to the United States.476 
 Thus, the U.S. invasion had as part of its justification the fear that 
Iraq might ally with al Qaeda.477 According to U.S. officials, the activi-
ties of al Qaeda leaders in Baghdad reinforced the inference that Iraq 
posted an imminent threat.478 This purported to reinforce a justifica-
tion for invasion as necessary for self-defense under U.N. norms.479 The 
problem with this argument was that, beyond the claims of Western 
powers, there was at best ambiguous evidence of an Iraqi alliance with 
al Qaeda.480 Moreover, even if Iraq did provide support to al Qaeda, 
neither the U.N. Charter nor norms of international law recognize re-
source cooperation in and of itself as constituting an actual military 
alliance.481 For this reason, the United States first sought authority from 
the U.N. Security Council, based on the Iraqi regime’s obstruction of 
the U.N.’s attempt to inspect its weapons facilities pursuant to the in-
ternational agreements made after the first Gulf War.482 The Security 
Council’s majority approbation suffered defeat after a veto threat, 
which left the United States to decide whether to undertake unilateral 
action.483 
 Having lost the opportunity to obtain formal international legiti-
mation, the United States next turned to bilateral diplomacy to secure 
international support outside the Security Council.484 In the author’s 
view, this partially legitimated the invasion, by virtue of the participa-
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tion of a plurality of States; the effect was to relegate dissenting States to 
unilateral objections, as they likewise lacked the power to secure official 
U.N. condemnation, even in the form of a symbolic gesture in the U.N. 
General Assembly. The result was active international support for the 
U.S. invasion, which removed from the United States the burden of 
showing an absolute justification based on a theory of self-defense.485 
Specifically, the aggregation of international support justified the ac-
tion under several theories, including that of the defense of the inter-
national community, and, more importantly, the fact that specific peo-
ples within Iraq had long been deprived of their right of self-determina-
tion.486 This argument was particularly compelling in light of the Iraqi 
regime’s ruthless suppression of both the Kurdish people in the north 
and the Marsh Arabs in the south.487 
 Thus, the U.S. invasion of Iraq found support in the international 
community based simultaneously on the justifications of quelling cross-
nation violence and supporting the rights of suppressed peoples to self-
determination.488 The justification of establishing a right of self-
determination for a people would have been insufficient.489 Likewise, it 
would have been difficult to justify invasion based solely on the immi-
nence of the threat of a resource alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda.490 
The confluence of these two justifications, however, bolstered by Iraq’s 
prior use of chemical weapons and evidence from national intelligence 
agencies regarding Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapon technology, com-
bined to enable the international community to support the U.S. inva-
sion.491 Now the question is how specifically to establish meaningful 
rights of self-determination.492 
 The challenge in Iraq is similar to that in Nigeria of former years, 
wherein the boundaries of the former colony enclosed three inde-
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pendently identifiable peoples within a single State.493 When the British 
undertook to meet this particular challenge, they made the choice to 
maintain the colonial boundaries, rather than to create a dangerous 
precedent of redrawing settled boundaries for the sake of individual 
people’s independence.494 The Organization of African Unity (today’s 
African Union) likewise faithfully observed the principle of respecting 
prior colonial boundaries in settling all disputes among post-colonial 
African States.495 Similarly, in Iraq, it was particularly difficulty to define 
the “Iraqi” people.496 Specifically, there were the ethnic divisions be-
tween Kurds, an Indo-European people related to the Iranians, and 
Arabs, the dominant ethnicity,497 and religious divisions between Sunni 
and Shi’a Muslims.498 Some measure of violence had characterized the 
prior interactions among these three groups (Sunni Kurds, Sunni Ar-
abs, and Shi’a Arabs), but it was unclear how much of that was actually 
a product of the defunct regime’s policies of violent oppression, with-
out which perhaps there may not have been any significant conflict 
among these groups.499 
 Throughout the occupation of Iraq, Western opinion-makers fre-
quently insisted that peoples of disparate identities in the Islamic civili-
zation were perpetually prone to violence against one another.500 That 
this proposition conflicted with reality appeared not to dissuade many 
from applying this stereotype to Iraq.501 There was, to be sure, a legiti-
mate question of whether after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein the 
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former British Mandate of Iraq still possessed sufficient cultural coher-
ence exist within pre-invasion borders. The only viable solution in Iraq, 
however, given international precedent on the matter of dealing with 
former colonies, was to keep the nation-state intact and allow the Iraqis 
themselves to work out their own harmony.502 
 The tensions surrounding self-determination and its applicability 
to any given State are ongoing and challenging. One major challenge is 
that of simply developing a good definition of a people.503 A “people,” 
may be defined by a number of factors, including religion, ethnicity, 
culture, geography, and civilization of origin.504 And according to 
James Mayall, there may be as many as “8000 identifiably separate cul-
tures.”505 But it would be ludicrous to argue that boundaries should be 
drawn so as to isolate distinctly similar groups of people. The poten-
tially huge number of States that would result is less concerning than 
the dangerous precedent of associating national boundaries with the 
territorial reaches of nominally distinct peoples. Such a position would 
incentivize surreptitious occupation and result in innumerable conflicts 
that the international community—now fragmented into an exponen-
tially larger number of States—would be incapable of moderating. An 
example of an error of judicial judgment that indeed moved in this di-
rection is Western Sahara, which incentivized foreign occupation for the 
sole purpose of securing international legitimacy for a new State based 
on an observation that it appeared to contain its own people.506 In fact, 
the Moroccan Sahara constituted such a sparsely populated region, 
more than any other proposed State except Greenland, that populating 
it with a foreign people was a comparatively easy proposition.507 Conse-
quently, any precedent of permitting the definition of national 
boundaries to follow the territory claimed by a nominally distinct peo-
ple is dangerous.508 
 With regard to modern doctrines for justifying the acquisition of 
territory, self-determination raises additional problems. For the principle 
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of self-determination to work, the people must be able to effectuate an 
actual transfer of title to the new sovereign.509 It is insufficient for a peo-
ple simply to declare that, via self-determination, they now have title to 
the territory.510 There must be some formal method of transitioning sov-
ereigns if self-determination is to be viable.511 The only effective doctrine 
for obtaining possession and transferring title appears to be cession.512 
The doctrine of occupation is problematic because the land would be 
unlikely to be considered terra nullius;513 the doctrine of conquest is no 
longer acceptable to the international community which obviates this 
doctrine as a justification;514 and, the doctrine of prescription would re-
quire the acquiescence of the exiting sovereign, which is unlikely to oc-
cur in most cases.515 Thus, only the doctrine of cession remains. 
F. Negotiation and Arbitration of Territorial Disputes 
 As traditional modes of acquisition become obsolete or scorned by 
the international community, and as their modern replacements seem 
to offer more problems than they solve, many States turn to negotia-
tions or arbitrations to resolve disputes.516 One forum for these meth-
ods of dispute resolution, the PCIJ, was founded by the League of Na-
tions under Article 14 of the Charter.517 The ICJ constitutes the 
successor to the PCIJ under the U.N.518 When establishing which party 
has title to the territory, the ICJ usually bases its decisions on treaties, 
the doctrine of uti possidetis, and effective control.519 The ICJ focuses 
primarily on legal documents when rendering decisions.520 
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 In a dispute between Botswana and Namibia, the ICJ looked to the 
Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890 to determine the legal status of, 
and boundary around, Kasikili/Sedudu Island.521 The treaty had estab-
lished spheres of influence between England and Germany.522 Despite 
various sources of evidence of Namibian prescriptive title, including 
maps and other written evidence, the ICJ held that, by the terms of the 
Anglo-German Treaty, the island belonged to Botswana.523 Similarly, in 
Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, the ICJ re-
jected Nigeria’s claim for consolidation of title and stated that effective 
control was insufficient to override conventional title.524 The ICJ ruled 
that the principle of uti possidetis determined title under the Anglo-
German Agreement of 11 March 1913.525 
 In some cases, however, title cannot be determined from binding 
agreements.526 In these situations, the court will look to whether a party 
has exercised effective control.527 In Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and 
Pulau Sipadan, the ICJ examined a number of documents but was un-
able to find any that established title.528 The court next looked to effec-
tive possession evidence and found that the island territories belonged 
to Malaysia based on current national legislation, pronouncements 
within administrative law, and quasi-judicial opinions.529 Although such 
evidence was relatively scarce, it covered a significant period of time 
and displayed a pattern manifesting Malaysia’s persistent intention to 
exercise political functions on the islands.530 In reaching its determina-
tion, the ICJ noted that it will only weigh evidence of effective posses-
sion when it is otherwise infeasible to establish clear title.531 
 Surveying the types of evidence used most frequently, one scholar 
determined that parties in international arbitrations over territory 
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brought a variety of reinforcing arguments.532 Litigants frequently put 
forth arguments based on geography, economy, culture, heritage, elit-
ism, and ideology as evidence for their respective claims.533 Such evi-
dence, however, was rarely persuasive if raised in lieu of treaties or other 
“hard” documents.534 The reason is that most of the disputes feature an 
array of conflicting arguments by both sides, but these arguments often 
rest on sparse evidence.535 Therefore, looking to treaties, agreements, 
and other “hard” evidence more readily enables the court to achieve 
sufficient clarity and certainty to support a confident ruling.536 
Conclusion and the Future 
 Modes of acquisition have taken many forms since the dawn of civi-
lizations, from rudimentary systems in which the most powerful actor 
might take what it could, to a modern, individual rights-based approach 
based on the collective experiences of Western civilization during the 
era of hegemonic expansion. Throughout the twentieth century, there 
were persistent attempts to eradicate the traditional doctrine of con-
quest and establish a system of peaceful transfer that recognizes the 
rights of people in addition to those of the State. The most prominent 
feature of this evolution was the establishment of international organiza-
tions to advocate peace and to protect the human rights of individuals. 
Unfortunately, these institutions, and the modern modes of peaceful 
acquisition they advocate, have proven inadequate. Even the strongest 
forms of condemnation from the international community have been 
unable to prevent the use of condemned practices to claim territory. 
 Part of the reason the modern modes of acquisition have failed to 
take control is perhaps their logical flaws. The concept of self-determin-
ation—namely, that every people should enjoy the right to consent to 
the form of government that will rule them—is limited in the extent to 
which it can be applied to every society on every continent. However, 
the practical limits to this principle, such as the prospect of 8000 sepa-
rate States in the world, are obvious. Beyond this, the burden of deter-
mining what exactly constitutes a “people” for purposes of establishing 
a country under the doctrine of self-determination would clog and 
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cripple the international legal system. Moreover, the precedent of 
granting independent States to often ill-defined independent peoples 
would undermine the integrity of national boundaries; it would not 
relax any tensions that might currently exist between groups. By now, it 
should go without saying providing a people a right of self-determin-
ation is not as simple as signing a declaration and then standing back to 
watch the birth of a new State. 
 The recent conflict in Iraq provides clear evidence that vindicating 
the right of self-determination takes huge amounts of time, treasure, 
and blood. The current Iraqi government may finally be the product of 
its people, but the role of the United States and its allies has been es-
sential to its stability, and will be for the foreseeable future. In other 
scenarios, it is possible that similar efforts might fall short of the ideal 
outcome that appears to be the Iraqi experience of the twenty-first cen-
tury. There remains no definition of what a “people” means in Iraq, but 
that question has waned in importance as Iraq’s multiple peoples ap-
pear to have settled into some semblance of harmonious coexistence. 
While the nation still suffers from conflicts among cultures and relig-
ions, these conflicts are now less violent than they were in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the U.S. invasion. 
 More generally, recent experience has provoked questions of 
whether it is just to go to war in order to effectuate self-determination. 
Under what conditions is it valid for foreign powers to invade, regard-
less of the virtuous ends that they espouse to justify their campaign? In 
the case of the Iraqi invasion, for example, the U.N. officially declined 
to back it, so the international community acted outside of that struc-
ture to pursue what it collectively felt to be a worthwhile goal. This was 
an unprecedented act in the history of international relations, and it is 
unclear where that response may lead in the future of the U.N. or even 
the definition of the international community itself. 
 Perhaps the best way to confront the concerns that attend the acqui-
sition of territory today is to utilize all available modes of acquisition in 
moderation. Rather than attempt to rely on the principle of self-
determination as a spearhead for the reduction of conflict, the interna-
tional community must develop a system for ascertaining the best mode 
of acquisition for each case. Moreover, in order to effectuate such a sys-
tem, the international community, whether via the U.N. or some other 
body—including the unsettling possibility of further ad hoc, bilaterally-
arranged international coalitions similar to that which supported the 
Iraq invasion—must be so organized as to wield collective authority in 
State relations. Since World War II, the modern system of imposing sanc-
tions and issuing strongly worded resolutions has been widely used to 
2012] The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition 57 
punish aggression. But that combination of remedies often seems more 
like a pro forma exercise in diplomacy than an effective means of effect 
needed change. Although such a system has worked in some situations, 
the international community is frequently helpless to stop aggression 
and acquisitions that result from centuries of cultural incompatibility. 
 Future domains of territorial acquisitions include space and the 
ocean floor. The 1960’s race to the Moon served as the catalyst for the 
development of an international framework to determine nation-states’ 
rights in space. In 1967, the U.N. reached a resolution in the matter by 
passing the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies.537 Although its primary purpose concerned the 
banning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the resolu-
tion provided a foundation to preserve space exploration for the good 
of all mankind, not for the advantage of individual nation-states.538 
 Principles of territorial acquisition may be necessary to resolve 
near-space disputes as well. International telecommunication networks 
rely on geosynchronous orbiting satellites.539 The International Tele-
communications Union, through INTELSAT, developed a system to 
allocate geosynchronous space and maintain satellite resources.540 Nev-
ertheless, non-member States predictably dispute the characterization 
of geosynchronous allocations as outer-space. For example, in 1976, the 
Bogota Declaration announced that “segments of the synchronous geo-
stationary orbit are an integral part of the territory over which the 
equatorial States exercise their national sovereignty.”541 
 To prevent rogue States from using force and relying on the doc-
trine of conquest to take territory, the international community must 
prepare to utilize sufficient force to subdue such uprisings. Beyond 
stopping aggression, however, the international community must also 
have some method for creating a system that will permit or induce rival 
cultures to live harmoniously. What is most interesting about the mode 
                                                                                                                      
537 See generally G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI)/21 U.N. Doc. A/RES/2222(XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966); 
G.A. Res. 1721 (XXI)/16 U.N. Doc. A/RES/1721(XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961). 
538 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 545. 
539 See id. at 549–52. Geosynchronous orbits occur approximately 22,300 miles above 
the equatorial line and allow satellites to remain fixed in relation to the Earth’s surface. See 
id. at 552. 
540 See id. at 549. Shaw notes that the communists established a comparable system 
called INTER-SPUTNIK. Id. 
541 Bogota Declaration (Dec. 7, 1976), in 6 J. Space L. 193, 193 (1978). Signatories to 
the Bogota Declaration include Brazil, Columbia, the Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Zaire. Id. at 196. 
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of reaction to the second Gulf War is the prospect that multiple modes 
of international cooperation, characterized by a combination of fixed 
associations of nations and ad hoc coalitions, may become this cen-
tury’s norm. Despite the uneasiness that this prospect will evoke in 
many quarters, it is possible that a competing system of cooperation, 
exemplified by the dissensus between the U.N. Security Council and 
the free coalition of States that backed the Iraq invasion, is superior to a 
fixed system that is the sole authority for international relations. 
 Although almost everyone can agree that wars and rogue States are 
undesirable, if the age-old status quo must suffer destruction, the inter-
national community must put into place an effective, realistic plan to end 
the justification for acquisition by way of the doctrine of conquest to dis-
suade rogue coalitions of States that might use conquest as a justification 
for territorial expansion. Meanwhile, it should review its current organ-
izational premises, as the dissensus between the U.N. Security Council 
and the ad hoc coalition in the Iraq case indicates that the current struc-
ture impedes true international consensus about how to handle the 
modern international emergencies. Calls to vest more power in the U.N. 
suffer from the misguided assumption that the optimal way to police the 
world is by delegating more national sovereignty to a collectivity. In fact, 
the international scale of conflict is analogous to the national scale of a 
major economy. Centralized control works in a corporation, but a coun-
try, let alone an international union, requires a wiser, more refined bal-
ancing of competing interests. Equilibrium can only result from multiple 
States pursuing self-interested ends in cooperation with all other States. 
In the end, the system must be arranged so that it would be against the 
interests of every State to flout international consensus. Insofar as all 
States come to depend on all others to meet their needs, and no State 
remains that relies on the vicissitudes of a sole human decision-maker on 
the matter of international relations, flexibility will breed peace. 
